Early Childhood Education Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Early Childhood Education - Essay Example Treatment of children in a family or society dictates how the family or society will be perceived in terms of success or failure. Isenberg & Jalongo, (1997) illustrate that childhood is the stage in life that is characterized by agility, curiosity and creativity. It is during this period of time that one decides on what to or not to be in future life. This therefore, implies that, a lot of attention is needed to get rid of undesirable characters which might associate with the child and grow with him/her to the future. Based on my profession and what I have gathered when learning this profession, given the opportunity to execute my duties, I will ensure that the children under my care obtain the best practices. This will be possible through incorporation of best learning practices such as practical learning methods into this system of education as echoed by Mallory & New (1994). According to Grotewell and Burton (2008), it is worth noting that not all children are born physically and mentally healthy. Some are born with physical disabilities while others suffer from mental disorders. In case this happens, it is possible that a child might be healthy both physically and mentally but born out of families which are not capable of providing for their basic needs. This can range from shelter, food, and clothing to comfort that they might need at some point in their childhood. The main objective of the early childhood initiative was to help young children and their families to survive which ever times they might be living. This is achieved through provision of support and intervention for the children and infants with priorities given to those who are disabled. Anning, Cullen & Fleer, (2004) explain that undertaking a course on early childhood education will open up opportunities in areas such as educational administrators, coordinators and librarians. Those trained

Discuss the relationship between the informal economy in the socialist Essay

Discuss the relationship between the informal economy in the socialist states and the emergence of capitalism in these states after 1989 - Essay Example This was referred to as the socialist experiment that became defunct in the year 1989 throughout the Eastern Europe for unidentified reasons, eventually resulting in the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. This in turn, unlocked new doors of transitions and socio cultural transitions in the region. The formal economy is the essence of the contemporary perceptive of the states following the capitalist concept to influence the globe whereas the informal economy is the unpredictable or irregular perception designed and practiced by specific people although these are less powerful than the ones endorsed by dominant power and wealth. The study of the same era and the historical accounts help one to understand the theory of socialism and its practice as well as the changes that occurred from region to region. For instance China, the largest country in East Asia developed into a socialist state in 1949 and the Republic of Cuba witnessed the Cuban Revolution that led to the overthrow of the Dictator government of Cuban President Fulgencio Batista on January 1, 1959 by the 26th of July movement and other revolutionary organizationsin 1959, and was declared a socialist state in 1961. The trends occurring in socialist and post socialist Eastern Europe and akin in the capitalist West, such as privatization, the growth of neo-liberalism or the weakening of the welfare state resulted in many changes over the years. According to Pine (1996) the importance of class and gender equality became bona fide in the Eastern European states after the end of socialist states therefore allowing equal rights to the women with the likes of men in the society. As in Poland where previously extremely progressive rights were practiced that failed to be implemented in the socialist period. The Eastern Europe observed the same with women consigned to the private sphere, depriving them of basic rights. The same observation has been derived by Foucault (1991) regarding the improvement in the governmental operations in terms of practicality and efficiency through the historical perspective by learning and inventing innovative likewise improved plans of governing. Disparagement further sti mulates such progress through the modifications in actions and extensions of limits. If we study the comparisons of some post socialism countries, using ethnographic examples we come to know that vast diversities from Hungary, Romania and Transylvania considering each nation has a different backdrop of the post socialism period along with specific array of tribulations. The Hungarian ethnographers demonstrated dissimilarities in personalities, interests and specializations between the North American and native European ethnographic studies. In Eastern Europe citizens were faced with colonialists, Western and capitalist society settings. Considering similar issues the anthropological studies and comparisons of the Eastern Europe with the Third and fourth world countries were conciliatory. As Verdery (1999) points out the presence of additional features of socialism that made general ideas significant for normal people living in regions having ethnic groups amalgamated rather than territorially

Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region

Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region DURAND LINE AND PAKHTOON DIVIDE AS THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN AFGAN PAK REGION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Durand Line[i], the notorious frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some people blame this frontier for all of Afghanistans current problems. And there are those who go so far as to blame it for the problems in Pakistan. Indeed, there are those who blame the Durand line not just for terrorism and other problems of instability in Pakistan, but even for the terrorist attacks suffered in London in July 2005, tracing their origins all the way back to the tribal agencies of North- West Pakistan. 2. Some people have even been so bold as to say that everything in Afghanistan would be sorted out if only the United States could cross over the frontier and ‘do its thing there. Such commentators seem little daunted by the fact that British administrators spent 150 years trying in vain to resolve the same problems which confront us today. The region that is today known as Afghanistan was long torn by ethnic and tribal rivalries. 3. The strategic significance of Afghanistan was not lost on either the British Empire or the Soviets. And hence, Afghanistan became a buffer between Communism and the West. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province along the border. 4. The geo strategic importance of Afghanistan has been a major factor in foreign policy formulations Pakistan. Afghanistan has always provided the much-needed strategic depth to Pakistan in all its policies against India. The Durand Line, becomes a very important factor as the Durand line, is still not accepted by the Pashtuns on either side. 5. In view of the above, it is essential to identify the fault line i.e. the Pakhtoon Divide and turbulent relationship between the two nations as the source of instability in the region, with specific reference to its effect on Afghan Pakistan relations. The study, while briefly looking at the events leading genesis of the problem will attempt to analyse whether turbulent Pakistan Afghanistan relations(which have not been cordial in spite of geographical contiguity and identity of religion, cultural and economic interests) and Pakhtoon divide legacy as the cause of instability in the region. METHODOLOGY Statement of the Problem 6. To analyse whether instability in Afghan Pak region can be attributed to turbulent relationship between the two nations and Pakhtoon Divide legacy. Justification for the Study 7. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province[ii] along the border.Incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the U.S led war in Afghanistan. In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have repeatedly attributed the growing strength of Al-Qaeda and resurgence of the Taliban to safe havens in this border region. 8. The rise of Taliban and the support provided to them by Pakistan has given a different complexion to the Afghan Pak crisis. Taliban led Afghanistan is an ally of Pakistan and the ambit of their relations cover Islamic fundamentalism, support to Kashmir militants and even strategic depth to Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India. Hence it is important to carry out an analysis of the reasons for instability in Afghan Pak region. Scope 9. This study concentrates on the historical perspectives, the Pakhtoon issue, the stands of both the nations on Pakhtoon issue, relations and policies adopted by both the countries which have led Afghanistan Pakistan region into a troubled area and rise of insurgency leading to instability in the region. Data Collection 10. The study is primarily based on information gathered from books written by authors of Indian, western origin and other Afghanistan experts. Other sources of information are articles written in Indian newspapers, defense journals and periodicals have been referred. Various internet sites too have been accessed to get the latest inputs. A detailed bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of the Dissertation 11. The study will be covered under the following heads :- (a) Chapter II : The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study of Legacy. (b) Chapter III : Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. (c) Chapter IV : Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. (d) Chapter V : Pakistans Afghan Policy. (e) Chapter VI : The Insurgency in The Border Area and Threat to Region. (f) Chapter VII : Recommendations. 12. Chapter II The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study Of Legacy. This chapter gives an overview of the historical perspective of the complexity of the present Pak Afghan relations which can be comprehended by understanding the historical background to the Pakhtoonian issue. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to analyse the British and Russian policies of imperialism and competition in Central and South Asia which compelled the to regard Afghanistan as ‘Zone of Interpenetration. The British ‘outer oriented ‘ frontier policy in the north western boders of India which resulted in vague ill defined Indo Afghan border and later hostile Pak Afghan relations. 13. Chapter III Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. Both countries have come to loggerheads many a times over Pakhtoonian issue. This chapter analyses arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions. 14. Chapter IV Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. This chapter deals with the Pastunistan Issue and Pak Afghan relations, wherein it is argued that the domestic restraints imposed by internal dynamics of the two countries have been responsible for continuation of hostilities. 15. Chapter V Pakistans Afghan Policy. This chapter will cover the interests of Pakistan in pursuing policies to give it control over Afghanistan and their unstinted support to the Taliban to accomplish this endeavor. 16. Chapter VI -The Insurgency In The Border Area And Threat to Region. The Talibanisation of Afghanistan and the various implications/threats it holds for the region would be analysed in the chapter. 17. Chapter VII Recommendations. The Road Ahead CHAPTER II The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power. Abdur Rehman Khan Amir of Afghanistan (1880-1901) THE PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE: STUDY OF LEGACY 1. The complexity of the present Afghan Pak relations can be comprehended better with some political background that led to Pakhtoonian issue[iii] a question relating to legal and political status of the trans Afghan Pakhtoons. 2. The Pakhtoons are ancient tribes[iv], they inhibited the eastern highlands and mountains of Afghanistan when Alexander armies passed through that area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. Afghanistan, as an independent country, is a recent phenome ­non. When Ahmed Shah Abdali was selected as the king by the Afghan tribes there was then no such thing as Afghanistan. The first thing for him to do, therefore, was to bring together various Afghan districts into one political unit. The period after the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773 saw a lot of confusion and intense struggle for power in Afghanistan. By that time the British had established themselves in most parts of India, extending their authority up to the Sutlej. 3. Meanwhile in the early 19th century the Sikh power under Ranjit Singh flourished in Punjab. The dominion of Ranjit Singh expanded considerably in the north-west as a result of political confusion in Afghanistan and extended up to the east of the Khyber Pass.[v] After the fall of the Sikh empire in 1849, the British occupied Sikh possessions, which brought them into direct contact with the Afghan territory for the first time.[vi] It is important to note that Afghanistans boundaries were not clearly defined at that time which gave rise to a number of uneasy and unhappy positions as the British and Russian empires exploited the vagueness of Afghan frontiers. 4. After the conquest of Punjab, the British influence unmis ­takably spread north-west ward. But the British were not the only power that was consolidating its position in the region. The Russians were also advancing in the same direction which made the British uneasy. They knew that Afghanistan having undefined boundaries is the only country between their empire and Russia. Finding direct control over Afghanistan expensive and difficult because of the rocky and mountainous land and Pakhtoons â€Å"tradi ­tional love of independence, Britain wanted to have an independent and strong—though not too strong—Afghanistan as a barrier to the expansion of Russian influence. In other words, the British were keen to make Afghanistan a buffer state between Russia and the British India. Afghanistan thus found itself caught in a vice between the two great powers. Close Border or Forward Policy 5. But boundaries looked increasingly important. By the 1840s the Russians had reached the Aral Sea and were slowly being drawn into Central Asia. In 1849 the Punjab passed into British hands, as did Sindh. By this point British India had as its effective border the foothills of the mountains where dwelt the Pushtun hill tribes. The tribes saw no reason to stop their traditional raids just because the territory was now British. So, like the Mughuls and Sikhs before them, the British were faced with the problem of how to control the tribes. 6. They tried first the ‘Close Border Policy'[vii] which held as a principle that British sovereignty should not be extended to areas which could not be governed effectively. Accordingly the foothills were fortified to keep out the hill-based tribal peoples and irregular troops, levies, were raised to resist attacks on the population of the foothills. To keep the tribesmen sweet, the British tried making agreements with them, they tried friendship, they tried goodwill, they tried allowances for good behavior, giving them money to provide services to keep the roads open, to protect communications, to deny sanctuary to outlaws in contravention of their tribal codes. But this didnt work very well. Expedition after expedition went into the hills to chastise the tribal people. Yet this was all much in vain, clear signs that this ‘close border policy was not working. 7. As the 19th century progressed, another approach was devised: the ‘Forward Policy'[viii], called the Sandeman system, which involved capturing and holding areas in the tribal zones in the hills. Strong points were captured, fortified, garrisoned and connected by roads which would be protected. The tribes would be allowed to run their own affairs in the hope they would gradually come under the influence of the British government. But this forward policy inevitably raised the question of where the border between British India and Afghanistan should be set. At the same time fears were growing about the advance of the Russian Empire. By the 1870s the Russians had been able to capture the great Central Asian cities of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva. Hence the appeal of the ‘forward policy which in its most extreme form posited that the frontier be pushed as far forward as possible, ideally to the genuine or ‘scientific frontier of the Hindu Kush, with Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar forming the first line of defense. This idea found brief expression in the Second Afghan war of 1878 1880 when the British invaded Afghanistan again and found themselves trying to hold the old Mughal frontier. But they failed not because of the Russians, but because of Afghan resistance. The Durand line[ix] 8. By the 1880s the Russians had advanced further and were pressing on the river Oxus and Afghanistan itself. By 1893, the British had concluded that formal borders needed to be established between Afghanistan and British India, so that everyone would know where they stood and the Russian advance could be held off from the British Empire in India. The man sent to negotiate was the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. 9. Durands main concern was to secure Afghanistans northern border with Russia. A first settlement had been made in 1885 using the Oxus River but the boundary had not been taken all the way east into the region of the Pamirs and the Wakhan. Durand was desperate to make sure that this part of the border was absolutely clear so that the Russians could not sneak down through the Pamir Mountains into northern India. The Amir dangled that card before Durand to get a better deal when the frontier between British India and Afghanistan was negotiated. It is not the case that the British presented a clearly thought-out proposal for a particular line for the frontier and threatened a further invasion if their proposal was not accepted. There was a lot of give and take in the negotiation. The Amir put forward an ambitious boundary proposal, the British suggested a very different frontier line which would include Waziristan in British India. After lot of to and fro, ultimately the Afghans agreed that Dir, Swat, Peshawar and Chitral should be British. In return the Afghans secured some strategic strong points, notably Asmar, which gave them access to Nuristan and various of Afghanistans eastern regions.[x] 10. Then, at the very last moment, when agreement had been reached that all of Waziristan would be British, Durand, almost as an afterthought, possibly as a concession to allow the Amir to gain a little face, suddenly allowed the Amir to keep the Birmal tract of Waziristan. This was not the best of ideas, since it involved splitting Waziristan and the tribal people in two. But it may be that the maps from which the Amir and Durand were working were not very good, for when the demarcation teams went out into the field to try to delimit the boundary, there were areas represented on the map which did not exist on the ground and vice versa. Memoirs indicate that the Amir was pleased with the settlement reached. Nevertheless at the same time the Amir secretly spread propaganda against the British, saying that he was not pleased and that it would be a good thing to move the Line over towards the east. 11. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for the last two decades of the 19th century. He was prevented from expanding externally by Russia in the North and North East, the British in the North and North West and Persia in the East. Internally, he was also surrounded by many difficulties. His first priority was to consolidate his position internally. After he had satisfactorily consolidated his position to an extent, he turned towards reforms that he felt were necessary for making Afghanistan a great nation in the future. Amir felt that reforms would not be possible until a boundary line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.[xi] 12. The Durand Line (refer Appendix ), as demarcated between 1893 and 1896, was drawn all the way from the Persian frontier to the Wakhan, the little area on which the British insisted to keep a distance between the British and Russian Empires. There were two exceptions which at that time remained undemarcated, an area in the region of Chitral and another area a little north of the routes towards Kabul the country of the Mohmand tribe. The demarcation team tried to make the line as sensible as possible by using natural features, such as mountain crests, streams and rivers as boundaries, thus splitting up areas of river drainage. They also tried to set up boundary pillars so that there was some physical evidence of the boundary. 13. A close look at the route of this 1900 mile long boundary, indicates that the first section follows the crest of the Hindu Kush Mountains, where there is only the occasional pass. This section was actually very secure, for given the height and the cold it was difficult to moves forces across the area. Next the Line moves further down towards the Mohmand hills, where there was one of the undemarcated sections. There are still few passes of importance in this region. However coming down to the vital strategic region, the number of passes increases. There is of course the Khyber Pass, another important pass in the Kurram Agency, and a third, the Tochi pass, which was an important trade and invasion route in the old days. Further on, in the area of Waziristan, the Line does not follow mountain crests and peaks so clearly. It is convoluted, following various peoples agricultural rights and field boundaries. The Line splits at least 12 villages in half and divides other villages from t heir agricultural territories. It becomes easier to follow further south where most of the land is just desert. 14. The line cuts tribes and tribal groups in half. The Birmal tract of Waziristan is on the Afghanistan side, with the rest of Waziristan on the British or Pakistani side. The Mohmand tribal areas are also cut in two. And, inevitably, because the border is generally in a very distant set of areas, it is highly porous and difficult to police, especially when family groups are on both sides. Particularly in Waziristan, there are many passes and paths through which it is easy to move from British India (or Paki- stan) into Afghanistan and back. 15. There were advantages of the Line for the British. There was a strategic advantage in that they held positions forward of the passes and controlled the heights, thus facilitating the policing of the passes. They also managed to achieve the tripartite border a vision they had held for a long time.[xii] The first part of the border was the buffer state, Afghanistan. The second part was the tribal areas in the hills, which the British did not try to govern, but simply garrisoned. These areas were vassal states, on the Indian side of the line but not under the sovereignty of British India. The third part was further back, where the real government of India started. The depth of this frontier system certainly kept the Russians away, but the corollary was that the British faced the familiar internal policing problem. 16. There were also advantages for the Afghans. As the ruler of Afghanistan was trying to unify his country and make it into a coherent state. Because he had been given a set of clear boundaries, it was much easier for him to project his power within those boundaries and to know that he would not be interfered with. Further north, he was able for the first time to extend his sway right up to the frontier. 17. For the people on the ground, there was not much of a practical effect. They still had freedom of movement. In the 1893 Treaty which he signed with Durand, Abdur Rahman promised not to try to project his influence over the border. But that did not stop him from inviting the tribesmen from those regions to Kabul and giving them honours, robes, money, guns anything to keep them sweet, anything to keep them on side.[xiii] 18. In 1904 Lord Curzon decided to divide the area to make it easier to administer. Originally the whole area was part of the Punjab. Lord Curzon split it off and created a government of the North Western Frontier Province. He established tribal areas beyond the administrative boundary of India where the Indian government did not presume to govern with regular laws. Different laws were set up for these tribal areas, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which had been in force in various forms since the 1870s, were now applied in a systematic way. They are a harsh set of laws, with some alarming implications and are still in force today, more or less in the form in which the British left them. All policing, executive and judicial functions are in the hands of a political agent, who is answerable, via a commissioner, originally directly to the government in Delhi, but now to the President of Pakistan. Political agents handle relations with tribes via chosen notables, called Maliks, who are subsidised and paid to keep order. 19. As for justice, the principle of collective responsibility and collective punishment still applies. Other members of the tribe can be held responsible for any crime committed by a member of the tribe. A tribal agent can hold a jirga, inviting several Maliks to help him decide points of fact in civil and criminal cases. But even then, the decision of this artificial court is not binding on the political agent. The cases are decided under customary law. There is also a Pakistan version of the West Lothian question. The frontier areas return members to the national Parliament, but the laws passed by the Parliament are not valid in the frontier areas unless there is a Presidential approval. Until 1996 there was no referendum and political parties were outlawed in those regions. 20. At the moment of independence for India and Pakistan there was a legal curiosity. The legal status of these areas changed. All the agreements they had were not with the government of India, for they were not part of British India. Their agreements were actually directly with the British Crown. Thus, legally speaking, at independence all these agreements lapsed and the tribal areas became independent.By November Pakistan had made arrangements with the tribesmen under which their relations with Pakistan would be on the same basis as their relations with the British. That is how Pakistan came to control these areas. They did not inherit them; they found them as de facto semi-sovereign independent territories. 21. There was a lot of bad feeling there has been between Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the border. In 1948 Afghanistan voted against Pakistan joining the United Nations. Pakistan delayed Afghan import and export goods on the border. Afghan radio called for independence for Pashtunistan. In 1949 Pakistan inadvertently attacked Afghanistan territory by air, a skirmish followed. Shortly afterwards a loya jirga, a great council in Kabul, repudiated all the boundary treaties made with the British, gave support to the idea of an independent Pashtunistan and urged that all the people in those areas should be given a referendum and the right to vote to join Afghanistan. In 1950 there was an incursion into the tribal areas by Afghan forces disguised as tribesmen. These were repulsed by Pakistan Pashtuns. Pakistan stopped Afghan imports for three months. In 1954 1955 the government of Pakistan decided to change the countrys administrative structure. Instead of having separate provinces such as Punjab and Sind, they tried to establish a single unified administrative area of West Pakistan to balance East Pakistan now Bangladesh. Afghanistan saw it as the tribal areas being taken away from their potential influence. There was no war, but diplomatic relations became frosty in the extreme. 22. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a hinterland which it wants to control as a fallback position, should there be any further conflict with India over Kashmir. The greatest concern however is controlling Kabul and stopping any more of these problems coming back over the borderline. With the 1980s and the Soviet invasion it seemed perfect sense to use the tribal areas as a point for launching the Mujahedin into Afghanistan. Again in the 1990s, its isolation made it the perfect place, not only to host those engaged in the fight for independence in Kashmir, but also to train the Taliban before they moved to control most of Afghanistan. In 2001 the area was again as a refuge for the Taliban. This suited the Pakistani government. They could maintain the Taliban areas as a Talibanised belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the government set up by the West in Afghanistan were to fall, this would give them the liberty to move back and to project their influence there. However, by pursuing this policy Pakistan has created a monster which it cannot control. The Afghan Taliban are fine for interfering in Afghanistan but the area has become a well of religious fanaticism as much opposed to the Pakistani government as it is to the Afghan government. 23. Where does this leave us? Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line as a legal international boundary. The Afghans claim agreement to the Line was obtained under duress. They question whether the documentation was in order. They sometimes suggest that the British made up the agreement after returning home. They also question whether Amir Abdur Rahman understood what he was really signing up to, whether he understood the maps and whether he actually intended the boundary to be a legal international boundary. They complain that, at the moment of independence, the Pashtuns were not given the option of full self-determination. They were only given the choice between joining India and joining Pakistan, not independence or joining Afghanistan. They say the jirgas held between Pakistan and the tribal people were probably not in order. They say that the treaties made between the British and the Afghans lapsed at the moment of Independence, for they claim that Pakistan is not a valid successor state to British India.[xiv] 24. Pakistan, of course, holds an entirely opposite viewpoint, arguing that the frontier, the Durand Line, is a legitimate international boundary, in 1893 and confirmed by later treaties in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. Pakistanis hold themselves to be the inheritors of the British legal rights at the moment of independence. 25. When the Line was drawn in 1895 1896, many of the British officials held the view that the Line was never meant to be an international boundary. It was a Line that delimited areas of influence, not sovereignty. There are various other legal considerations. In international law, lines dividing spheres of influence often develop into proper international boundary lines, sometimes even without the explicit say-so of the states concerned. What international adjudicators look at is not just the original treaties; these can often be very unimportant. What matters is the practice of the states. 26. The Line is convoluted, but there are many convoluted borders all over the world where there are no problems. The real problem is that the Line itself generates instability, it is not policeable, and the constitution of the Tribal Areas does not permit economic development to take place. In the 60 years since independence Pakistan has not been able to bring these areas under proper administration. They remain a well of instability, which cannot help harming the relation and ultimate interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. With such a peculiar constitutional status in the Tribal Areas, there is no real possibility of stability, of establishing the rule of law, a sound banking system, the accountability of local officials, or putting in place the frameworks necessary for business and commerce. CHAPTER III When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.[xv] An old Afghan Saying. CONFLICTING STANDS ON PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE 1. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and the result of the arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. The two countries have come to loggerheads many a time over the Pakhtoonistan Issue[xvi]. Before analysing the arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions, it is necessary to .be clear about the concept of Pakhtoonistan. The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand Line as a troublesome tribal boundary. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self- determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two[xvii]. 2. Pakhtoonistan, conceived as a hypothetical state by Pakistan, has been defined differently by three distinct sources, i.e. the Afghans, the Pakhtoons living outside Pakistan and the Pakhtoons within Pakistan. According to Afghan official sources, Pakhtoonistan broadly comprises two provinces of Pakistan, i.e. North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. In other words it extends from Baluchistan in the south to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. According to another version, the Pakhtoon leaders in Pakistan, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, explained that to them Pakhtoonistan had always meant the existing province of NWFP which should be renamed after the Pakhtoons and granted autonomy within Pakistan. 3. The total area of Pakhtoonistan is nearly 39,259 square miles. Politically, the area is divided into two sections—the tribal territory and the settled districts. Though language has been described as the most practical touchstone of identity of the people, there is a lacuna in Pakhtoonistan. Almost all people in Pakhtoonistan speak Pushto or Pakhto, but in some places, which are not inha ­bited by the Pakhtoons, the language of the people is not Pushto. Hence, it evident that all people in Pakhtoonistan do not speak Pushto or Pakhto. In view of the importance of the Pakhtoonistan issue in foreign policy adopted by Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is neces ­sary to analyse in some detail the positions taken by the two countries. Afghanistan Case 4. The claims of the Afghans are based on the assumption that the Pakhtoons are akin to them from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical as well as traditional points of view. Their main contention is that Afghanistan accepted the Durand agreement under duress as Amir Abdur Rahman had been operating under several internal and external constraints while negotiating with the British. The line drawn in accordance with that treaty was invalid, by which, the Afghans argued, their blood brothers had been forcibly separated. Second, as the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they also contend that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and the River Indus.[xviii] 5. At the time of partition, the fate of the North-West Frontier province was left undecided, pending a referendum. The Afghan government indicated that under no circumstances it would accept the outcome of the referendum as a fair mea ns of resolving the problem. Afghanistans argument is that the decision on the `referendum was taken unilaterally by the British government. But a decision, in order to be valid, should be taken by all the concerned parties in mutual consultation with one another. More ­over, it was pleaded that the Pakhtoons were given the limited choice to join either India or Pakistan only and not the option to unite with their motherl Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region Causes of Instability in Afghan Pak Region DURAND LINE AND PAKHTOON DIVIDE AS THE CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN AFGAN PAK REGION CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Durand Line[i], the notorious frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some people blame this frontier for all of Afghanistans current problems. And there are those who go so far as to blame it for the problems in Pakistan. Indeed, there are those who blame the Durand line not just for terrorism and other problems of instability in Pakistan, but even for the terrorist attacks suffered in London in July 2005, tracing their origins all the way back to the tribal agencies of North- West Pakistan. 2. Some people have even been so bold as to say that everything in Afghanistan would be sorted out if only the United States could cross over the frontier and ‘do its thing there. Such commentators seem little daunted by the fact that British administrators spent 150 years trying in vain to resolve the same problems which confront us today. The region that is today known as Afghanistan was long torn by ethnic and tribal rivalries. 3. The strategic significance of Afghanistan was not lost on either the British Empire or the Soviets. And hence, Afghanistan became a buffer between Communism and the West. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province along the border. 4. The geo strategic importance of Afghanistan has been a major factor in foreign policy formulations Pakistan. Afghanistan has always provided the much-needed strategic depth to Pakistan in all its policies against India. The Durand Line, becomes a very important factor as the Durand line, is still not accepted by the Pashtuns on either side. 5. In view of the above, it is essential to identify the fault line i.e. the Pakhtoon Divide and turbulent relationship between the two nations as the source of instability in the region, with specific reference to its effect on Afghan Pakistan relations. The study, while briefly looking at the events leading genesis of the problem will attempt to analyse whether turbulent Pakistan Afghanistan relations(which have not been cordial in spite of geographical contiguity and identity of religion, cultural and economic interests) and Pakhtoon divide legacy as the cause of instability in the region. METHODOLOGY Statement of the Problem 6. To analyse whether instability in Afghan Pak region can be attributed to turbulent relationship between the two nations and Pakhtoon Divide legacy. Justification for the Study 7. Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but the approximate 1500 mile long Durand Line along Pakistan remains the most dangerous. Kabul has never recognised the line as an international border, instead claiming the Pashtun territories in Pakistan that comprise the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of North West Frontier Province[ii] along the border.Incidents of violence have increased on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the U.S led war in Afghanistan. In the last several years, U.S. officials and national intelligence reports have repeatedly attributed the growing strength of Al-Qaeda and resurgence of the Taliban to safe havens in this border region. 8. The rise of Taliban and the support provided to them by Pakistan has given a different complexion to the Afghan Pak crisis. Taliban led Afghanistan is an ally of Pakistan and the ambit of their relations cover Islamic fundamentalism, support to Kashmir militants and even strategic depth to Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India. Hence it is important to carry out an analysis of the reasons for instability in Afghan Pak region. Scope 9. This study concentrates on the historical perspectives, the Pakhtoon issue, the stands of both the nations on Pakhtoon issue, relations and policies adopted by both the countries which have led Afghanistan Pakistan region into a troubled area and rise of insurgency leading to instability in the region. Data Collection 10. The study is primarily based on information gathered from books written by authors of Indian, western origin and other Afghanistan experts. Other sources of information are articles written in Indian newspapers, defense journals and periodicals have been referred. Various internet sites too have been accessed to get the latest inputs. A detailed bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of the Dissertation 11. The study will be covered under the following heads :- (a) Chapter II : The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study of Legacy. (b) Chapter III : Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. (c) Chapter IV : Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. (d) Chapter V : Pakistans Afghan Policy. (e) Chapter VI : The Insurgency in The Border Area and Threat to Region. (f) Chapter VII : Recommendations. 12. Chapter II The Pakhtoonian Issue: Study Of Legacy. This chapter gives an overview of the historical perspective of the complexity of the present Pak Afghan relations which can be comprehended by understanding the historical background to the Pakhtoonian issue. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to analyse the British and Russian policies of imperialism and competition in Central and South Asia which compelled the to regard Afghanistan as ‘Zone of Interpenetration. The British ‘outer oriented ‘ frontier policy in the north western boders of India which resulted in vague ill defined Indo Afghan border and later hostile Pak Afghan relations. 13. Chapter III Conflicting Stands on Pakhtoonian Issue. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. Both countries have come to loggerheads many a times over Pakhtoonian issue. This chapter analyses arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions. 14. Chapter IV Pak Afghan Relations and Pakhtoonian Issue. This chapter deals with the Pastunistan Issue and Pak Afghan relations, wherein it is argued that the domestic restraints imposed by internal dynamics of the two countries have been responsible for continuation of hostilities. 15. Chapter V Pakistans Afghan Policy. This chapter will cover the interests of Pakistan in pursuing policies to give it control over Afghanistan and their unstinted support to the Taliban to accomplish this endeavor. 16. Chapter VI -The Insurgency In The Border Area And Threat to Region. The Talibanisation of Afghanistan and the various implications/threats it holds for the region would be analysed in the chapter. 17. Chapter VII Recommendations. The Road Ahead CHAPTER II The first and most important advice that I can give to my successors and people to make Afghanistan into a great kingdom is to impress upon their minds the value of unity; unity, and unity alone, can make it into a great power. Abdur Rehman Khan Amir of Afghanistan (1880-1901) THE PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE: STUDY OF LEGACY 1. The complexity of the present Afghan Pak relations can be comprehended better with some political background that led to Pakhtoonian issue[iii] a question relating to legal and political status of the trans Afghan Pakhtoons. 2. The Pakhtoons are ancient tribes[iv], they inhibited the eastern highlands and mountains of Afghanistan when Alexander armies passed through that area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. Afghanistan, as an independent country, is a recent phenome ­non. When Ahmed Shah Abdali was selected as the king by the Afghan tribes there was then no such thing as Afghanistan. The first thing for him to do, therefore, was to bring together various Afghan districts into one political unit. The period after the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773 saw a lot of confusion and intense struggle for power in Afghanistan. By that time the British had established themselves in most parts of India, extending their authority up to the Sutlej. 3. Meanwhile in the early 19th century the Sikh power under Ranjit Singh flourished in Punjab. The dominion of Ranjit Singh expanded considerably in the north-west as a result of political confusion in Afghanistan and extended up to the east of the Khyber Pass.[v] After the fall of the Sikh empire in 1849, the British occupied Sikh possessions, which brought them into direct contact with the Afghan territory for the first time.[vi] It is important to note that Afghanistans boundaries were not clearly defined at that time which gave rise to a number of uneasy and unhappy positions as the British and Russian empires exploited the vagueness of Afghan frontiers. 4. After the conquest of Punjab, the British influence unmis ­takably spread north-west ward. But the British were not the only power that was consolidating its position in the region. The Russians were also advancing in the same direction which made the British uneasy. They knew that Afghanistan having undefined boundaries is the only country between their empire and Russia. Finding direct control over Afghanistan expensive and difficult because of the rocky and mountainous land and Pakhtoons â€Å"tradi ­tional love of independence, Britain wanted to have an independent and strong—though not too strong—Afghanistan as a barrier to the expansion of Russian influence. In other words, the British were keen to make Afghanistan a buffer state between Russia and the British India. Afghanistan thus found itself caught in a vice between the two great powers. Close Border or Forward Policy 5. But boundaries looked increasingly important. By the 1840s the Russians had reached the Aral Sea and were slowly being drawn into Central Asia. In 1849 the Punjab passed into British hands, as did Sindh. By this point British India had as its effective border the foothills of the mountains where dwelt the Pushtun hill tribes. The tribes saw no reason to stop their traditional raids just because the territory was now British. So, like the Mughuls and Sikhs before them, the British were faced with the problem of how to control the tribes. 6. They tried first the ‘Close Border Policy'[vii] which held as a principle that British sovereignty should not be extended to areas which could not be governed effectively. Accordingly the foothills were fortified to keep out the hill-based tribal peoples and irregular troops, levies, were raised to resist attacks on the population of the foothills. To keep the tribesmen sweet, the British tried making agreements with them, they tried friendship, they tried goodwill, they tried allowances for good behavior, giving them money to provide services to keep the roads open, to protect communications, to deny sanctuary to outlaws in contravention of their tribal codes. But this didnt work very well. Expedition after expedition went into the hills to chastise the tribal people. Yet this was all much in vain, clear signs that this ‘close border policy was not working. 7. As the 19th century progressed, another approach was devised: the ‘Forward Policy'[viii], called the Sandeman system, which involved capturing and holding areas in the tribal zones in the hills. Strong points were captured, fortified, garrisoned and connected by roads which would be protected. The tribes would be allowed to run their own affairs in the hope they would gradually come under the influence of the British government. But this forward policy inevitably raised the question of where the border between British India and Afghanistan should be set. At the same time fears were growing about the advance of the Russian Empire. By the 1870s the Russians had been able to capture the great Central Asian cities of Bokhara, Samarkand and Khiva. Hence the appeal of the ‘forward policy which in its most extreme form posited that the frontier be pushed as far forward as possible, ideally to the genuine or ‘scientific frontier of the Hindu Kush, with Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar forming the first line of defense. This idea found brief expression in the Second Afghan war of 1878 1880 when the British invaded Afghanistan again and found themselves trying to hold the old Mughal frontier. But they failed not because of the Russians, but because of Afghan resistance. The Durand line[ix] 8. By the 1880s the Russians had advanced further and were pressing on the river Oxus and Afghanistan itself. By 1893, the British had concluded that formal borders needed to be established between Afghanistan and British India, so that everyone would know where they stood and the Russian advance could be held off from the British Empire in India. The man sent to negotiate was the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. 9. Durands main concern was to secure Afghanistans northern border with Russia. A first settlement had been made in 1885 using the Oxus River but the boundary had not been taken all the way east into the region of the Pamirs and the Wakhan. Durand was desperate to make sure that this part of the border was absolutely clear so that the Russians could not sneak down through the Pamir Mountains into northern India. The Amir dangled that card before Durand to get a better deal when the frontier between British India and Afghanistan was negotiated. It is not the case that the British presented a clearly thought-out proposal for a particular line for the frontier and threatened a further invasion if their proposal was not accepted. There was a lot of give and take in the negotiation. The Amir put forward an ambitious boundary proposal, the British suggested a very different frontier line which would include Waziristan in British India. After lot of to and fro, ultimately the Afghans agreed that Dir, Swat, Peshawar and Chitral should be British. In return the Afghans secured some strategic strong points, notably Asmar, which gave them access to Nuristan and various of Afghanistans eastern regions.[x] 10. Then, at the very last moment, when agreement had been reached that all of Waziristan would be British, Durand, almost as an afterthought, possibly as a concession to allow the Amir to gain a little face, suddenly allowed the Amir to keep the Birmal tract of Waziristan. This was not the best of ideas, since it involved splitting Waziristan and the tribal people in two. But it may be that the maps from which the Amir and Durand were working were not very good, for when the demarcation teams went out into the field to try to delimit the boundary, there were areas represented on the map which did not exist on the ground and vice versa. Memoirs indicate that the Amir was pleased with the settlement reached. Nevertheless at the same time the Amir secretly spread propaganda against the British, saying that he was not pleased and that it would be a good thing to move the Line over towards the east. 11. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for the last two decades of the 19th century. He was prevented from expanding externally by Russia in the North and North East, the British in the North and North West and Persia in the East. Internally, he was also surrounded by many difficulties. His first priority was to consolidate his position internally. After he had satisfactorily consolidated his position to an extent, he turned towards reforms that he felt were necessary for making Afghanistan a great nation in the future. Amir felt that reforms would not be possible until a boundary line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.[xi] 12. The Durand Line (refer Appendix ), as demarcated between 1893 and 1896, was drawn all the way from the Persian frontier to the Wakhan, the little area on which the British insisted to keep a distance between the British and Russian Empires. There were two exceptions which at that time remained undemarcated, an area in the region of Chitral and another area a little north of the routes towards Kabul the country of the Mohmand tribe. The demarcation team tried to make the line as sensible as possible by using natural features, such as mountain crests, streams and rivers as boundaries, thus splitting up areas of river drainage. They also tried to set up boundary pillars so that there was some physical evidence of the boundary. 13. A close look at the route of this 1900 mile long boundary, indicates that the first section follows the crest of the Hindu Kush Mountains, where there is only the occasional pass. This section was actually very secure, for given the height and the cold it was difficult to moves forces across the area. Next the Line moves further down towards the Mohmand hills, where there was one of the undemarcated sections. There are still few passes of importance in this region. However coming down to the vital strategic region, the number of passes increases. There is of course the Khyber Pass, another important pass in the Kurram Agency, and a third, the Tochi pass, which was an important trade and invasion route in the old days. Further on, in the area of Waziristan, the Line does not follow mountain crests and peaks so clearly. It is convoluted, following various peoples agricultural rights and field boundaries. The Line splits at least 12 villages in half and divides other villages from t heir agricultural territories. It becomes easier to follow further south where most of the land is just desert. 14. The line cuts tribes and tribal groups in half. The Birmal tract of Waziristan is on the Afghanistan side, with the rest of Waziristan on the British or Pakistani side. The Mohmand tribal areas are also cut in two. And, inevitably, because the border is generally in a very distant set of areas, it is highly porous and difficult to police, especially when family groups are on both sides. Particularly in Waziristan, there are many passes and paths through which it is easy to move from British India (or Paki- stan) into Afghanistan and back. 15. There were advantages of the Line for the British. There was a strategic advantage in that they held positions forward of the passes and controlled the heights, thus facilitating the policing of the passes. They also managed to achieve the tripartite border a vision they had held for a long time.[xii] The first part of the border was the buffer state, Afghanistan. The second part was the tribal areas in the hills, which the British did not try to govern, but simply garrisoned. These areas were vassal states, on the Indian side of the line but not under the sovereignty of British India. The third part was further back, where the real government of India started. The depth of this frontier system certainly kept the Russians away, but the corollary was that the British faced the familiar internal policing problem. 16. There were also advantages for the Afghans. As the ruler of Afghanistan was trying to unify his country and make it into a coherent state. Because he had been given a set of clear boundaries, it was much easier for him to project his power within those boundaries and to know that he would not be interfered with. Further north, he was able for the first time to extend his sway right up to the frontier. 17. For the people on the ground, there was not much of a practical effect. They still had freedom of movement. In the 1893 Treaty which he signed with Durand, Abdur Rahman promised not to try to project his influence over the border. But that did not stop him from inviting the tribesmen from those regions to Kabul and giving them honours, robes, money, guns anything to keep them sweet, anything to keep them on side.[xiii] 18. In 1904 Lord Curzon decided to divide the area to make it easier to administer. Originally the whole area was part of the Punjab. Lord Curzon split it off and created a government of the North Western Frontier Province. He established tribal areas beyond the administrative boundary of India where the Indian government did not presume to govern with regular laws. Different laws were set up for these tribal areas, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which had been in force in various forms since the 1870s, were now applied in a systematic way. They are a harsh set of laws, with some alarming implications and are still in force today, more or less in the form in which the British left them. All policing, executive and judicial functions are in the hands of a political agent, who is answerable, via a commissioner, originally directly to the government in Delhi, but now to the President of Pakistan. Political agents handle relations with tribes via chosen notables, called Maliks, who are subsidised and paid to keep order. 19. As for justice, the principle of collective responsibility and collective punishment still applies. Other members of the tribe can be held responsible for any crime committed by a member of the tribe. A tribal agent can hold a jirga, inviting several Maliks to help him decide points of fact in civil and criminal cases. But even then, the decision of this artificial court is not binding on the political agent. The cases are decided under customary law. There is also a Pakistan version of the West Lothian question. The frontier areas return members to the national Parliament, but the laws passed by the Parliament are not valid in the frontier areas unless there is a Presidential approval. Until 1996 there was no referendum and political parties were outlawed in those regions. 20. At the moment of independence for India and Pakistan there was a legal curiosity. The legal status of these areas changed. All the agreements they had were not with the government of India, for they were not part of British India. Their agreements were actually directly with the British Crown. Thus, legally speaking, at independence all these agreements lapsed and the tribal areas became independent.By November Pakistan had made arrangements with the tribesmen under which their relations with Pakistan would be on the same basis as their relations with the British. That is how Pakistan came to control these areas. They did not inherit them; they found them as de facto semi-sovereign independent territories. 21. There was a lot of bad feeling there has been between Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the border. In 1948 Afghanistan voted against Pakistan joining the United Nations. Pakistan delayed Afghan import and export goods on the border. Afghan radio called for independence for Pashtunistan. In 1949 Pakistan inadvertently attacked Afghanistan territory by air, a skirmish followed. Shortly afterwards a loya jirga, a great council in Kabul, repudiated all the boundary treaties made with the British, gave support to the idea of an independent Pashtunistan and urged that all the people in those areas should be given a referendum and the right to vote to join Afghanistan. In 1950 there was an incursion into the tribal areas by Afghan forces disguised as tribesmen. These were repulsed by Pakistan Pashtuns. Pakistan stopped Afghan imports for three months. In 1954 1955 the government of Pakistan decided to change the countrys administrative structure. Instead of having separate provinces such as Punjab and Sind, they tried to establish a single unified administrative area of West Pakistan to balance East Pakistan now Bangladesh. Afghanistan saw it as the tribal areas being taken away from their potential influence. There was no war, but diplomatic relations became frosty in the extreme. 22. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a hinterland which it wants to control as a fallback position, should there be any further conflict with India over Kashmir. The greatest concern however is controlling Kabul and stopping any more of these problems coming back over the borderline. With the 1980s and the Soviet invasion it seemed perfect sense to use the tribal areas as a point for launching the Mujahedin into Afghanistan. Again in the 1990s, its isolation made it the perfect place, not only to host those engaged in the fight for independence in Kashmir, but also to train the Taliban before they moved to control most of Afghanistan. In 2001 the area was again as a refuge for the Taliban. This suited the Pakistani government. They could maintain the Taliban areas as a Talibanised belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the government set up by the West in Afghanistan were to fall, this would give them the liberty to move back and to project their influence there. However, by pursuing this policy Pakistan has created a monster which it cannot control. The Afghan Taliban are fine for interfering in Afghanistan but the area has become a well of religious fanaticism as much opposed to the Pakistani government as it is to the Afghan government. 23. Where does this leave us? Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line as a legal international boundary. The Afghans claim agreement to the Line was obtained under duress. They question whether the documentation was in order. They sometimes suggest that the British made up the agreement after returning home. They also question whether Amir Abdur Rahman understood what he was really signing up to, whether he understood the maps and whether he actually intended the boundary to be a legal international boundary. They complain that, at the moment of independence, the Pashtuns were not given the option of full self-determination. They were only given the choice between joining India and joining Pakistan, not independence or joining Afghanistan. They say the jirgas held between Pakistan and the tribal people were probably not in order. They say that the treaties made between the British and the Afghans lapsed at the moment of Independence, for they claim that Pakistan is not a valid successor state to British India.[xiv] 24. Pakistan, of course, holds an entirely opposite viewpoint, arguing that the frontier, the Durand Line, is a legitimate international boundary, in 1893 and confirmed by later treaties in 1905, 1919, 1921 and 1930. Pakistanis hold themselves to be the inheritors of the British legal rights at the moment of independence. 25. When the Line was drawn in 1895 1896, many of the British officials held the view that the Line was never meant to be an international boundary. It was a Line that delimited areas of influence, not sovereignty. There are various other legal considerations. In international law, lines dividing spheres of influence often develop into proper international boundary lines, sometimes even without the explicit say-so of the states concerned. What international adjudicators look at is not just the original treaties; these can often be very unimportant. What matters is the practice of the states. 26. The Line is convoluted, but there are many convoluted borders all over the world where there are no problems. The real problem is that the Line itself generates instability, it is not policeable, and the constitution of the Tribal Areas does not permit economic development to take place. In the 60 years since independence Pakistan has not been able to bring these areas under proper administration. They remain a well of instability, which cannot help harming the relation and ultimate interests of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. With such a peculiar constitutional status in the Tribal Areas, there is no real possibility of stability, of establishing the rule of law, a sound banking system, the accountability of local officials, or putting in place the frameworks necessary for business and commerce. CHAPTER III When Allah had made the rest of the world, He saw there was a lot of rubbish left over, bits and pieces and things that did not fit anywhere else. He collected them all together and threw them down on the earth. That was Afghanistan.[xv] An old Afghan Saying. CONFLICTING STANDS ON PAKHTOONIAN ISSUE 1. The bitterness and hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan are an imperial legacy and the result of the arbitrary segregation of Pakhtoons by the Durand Line in disregard of their ethnic affinities. The two countries have come to loggerheads many a time over the Pakhtoonistan Issue[xvi]. Before analysing the arguments advanced by both the countries in favor of their positions, it is necessary to .be clear about the concept of Pakhtoonistan. The issue of Pushtunistan is closely linked with the Durand Line as a troublesome tribal boundary. Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self- determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two[xvii]. 2. Pakhtoonistan, conceived as a hypothetical state by Pakistan, has been defined differently by three distinct sources, i.e. the Afghans, the Pakhtoons living outside Pakistan and the Pakhtoons within Pakistan. According to Afghan official sources, Pakhtoonistan broadly comprises two provinces of Pakistan, i.e. North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. In other words it extends from Baluchistan in the south to Chitral and Gilgit in the north. According to another version, the Pakhtoon leaders in Pakistan, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, explained that to them Pakhtoonistan had always meant the existing province of NWFP which should be renamed after the Pakhtoons and granted autonomy within Pakistan. 3. The total area of Pakhtoonistan is nearly 39,259 square miles. Politically, the area is divided into two sections—the tribal territory and the settled districts. Though language has been described as the most practical touchstone of identity of the people, there is a lacuna in Pakhtoonistan. Almost all people in Pakhtoonistan speak Pushto or Pakhto, but in some places, which are not inha ­bited by the Pakhtoons, the language of the people is not Pushto. Hence, it evident that all people in Pakhtoonistan do not speak Pushto or Pakhto. In view of the importance of the Pakhtoonistan issue in foreign policy adopted by Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is neces ­sary to analyse in some detail the positions taken by the two countries. Afghanistan Case 4. The claims of the Afghans are based on the assumption that the Pakhtoons are akin to them from the ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical as well as traditional points of view. Their main contention is that Afghanistan accepted the Durand agreement under duress as Amir Abdur Rahman had been operating under several internal and external constraints while negotiating with the British. The line drawn in accordance with that treaty was invalid, by which, the Afghans argued, their blood brothers had been forcibly separated. Second, as the British Government in India has ceased to exist, they also contend that the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and the River Indus.[xviii] 5. At the time of partition, the fate of the North-West Frontier province was left undecided, pending a referendum. The Afghan government indicated that under no circumstances it would accept the outcome of the referendum as a fair mea ns of resolving the problem. Afghanistans argument is that the decision on the `referendum was taken unilaterally by the British government. But a decision, in order to be valid, should be taken by all the concerned parties in mutual consultation with one another. More ­over, it was pleaded that the Pakhtoons were given the limited choice to join either India or Pakistan only and not the option to unite with their motherl

Music - Bonos Path Towards Spiritual Enlightenment Essay -- Explorato

Bono's Path Towards Spiritual Enlightenment While most celebrities keep their religious beliefs private, the music of the Irish rock group U2, with lyrics written by lead singer Bono, contains many religious references and ideas. A closer analysis of the song lyrics shows an evolution of the religious ideas contained within. The changing and development of these ideas corresponds to many psychological and sociological theories of faith evolution, including those of Alfred Adler and James Fowler. Adlerian theory posits that "Our ideas about God are important indicators of how we view the world. According to Adler these ideas have changed over time, as our vision of the world—and our place in it—has changed" (Nielson). There are two kinds of changes that may occur: those that advance the faith, and those that incite doubt or stagnation, as reported by Paul Fritz. Fritz, a minister, incorporated the ideas of sociologist Jean Merton into his theory of faith evolution. Fowler, in Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Hum an Development and the Quest for Meaning, states that faith evolves as individuals move through life, changing at each stage the way they make sense of existence. Commenting on Fowler's theory, John Testerman writes, "The stages of faith can be thought of as the different lenses through which we view the world as we journey through life." A careful study of Bono's lyrics can show what kind of "spiritual glasses" he wears at that stage of his life, and how his outlook on the world shapes the portrayal of his beliefs. While the evolution of faith and spiritual beliefs may be divided into stages, a person may be in between stages at any time, exhibiting the characteristics of more than one stage. In Fritz's model, a b... ... Cambridge Bible. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Fowler, James W. Stages of Faith: the Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning. Harper: San Francisco, 1995. Fritz, Paul. Home page. 10 Mar, 2002. "8 Stages of Faith." . Nielsen, Michael. Home page. 3 Nov. 2003. Psychology of Religion Pages. . "The Stages of Faith." The Journal of Religion and Society. Home page. 1 Nov. 2002. . 2 Nov. 2002. Testerman, John. Home page. Mar. 1995. The Stages of Faith. . U2. Achtung, Baby. Island, 1991. U2. All That You Can't Leave Behind. Island, 2000. U2. The Joshua Tree. Island, 1987. U2. October. Island, 1982. U2. POP. Island, 1997. U2. War. Island, 1980.

Did Microsoft Violate Antitrust Policy?

â€Å"The US complaint has been filed by a Tangent, a small Burlingame, California-based hardware vendor that says it is a Microsoft certified partner, but has still been â€Å"caused significant harm† by â€Å"Microsoft's exclusionary and restrictive practices†[1]The Northern California Company Tangent, who is also a Microsoft Certified Partner, has claimed that Microsoft has caused them â€Å"significant harm† through â€Å"exclusionary and restrictive† practices.[2]In its complaint, Tangent describes patterns of anticompetitive practices by Microsoft.     The activities listed by Tangent incorporate the procedure of no-option bundling of Outlook (electronic mail software) with Office (a suite of word processing, financial, media and various business software) and Active Directory (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol which provide central authentication and authorization services for Windows based computers) with Windows Server (host integration). The forced process under the bundling system also includes the Windows Media Player (a software application player and library for digital media) and Windows Media Server (advanced live video and audio streaming functionality) along with the desktop personal computer and the server operating system, e.g. XP, Vista, etc.Tangent attorneys’ stated in the law suit, â€Å"Microsoft's exclusionary and restrictive practices†¦have caused significant harm to (Tangent) by increasing, maintaining or stabilizing the price it paid for Microsoft's operating system software above competitive levels,† [3]In a filing with the US District Court for the Northern District of California, Tangent’s resident territory and the right of the plaintiff to file locally, is in the clear supportive position to show cause of how Microsoft has historically continued to engage in anticompetitive conduct and practices. Thereby causing irreparable financial and market damages by directly man ipulating by different means in a number of forms the price Tangent has paid for Microsoft's operating system software.   Clearly upon comparison and review the prices are openly above competitive degrees.Tangent has been able to list in the detail the historical relation of the personal computer and the Microsoft factor.   They contend that Microsoft, in the letter of the law as well as the spirit, has still failed to operate within number of instruction guidelines and continues to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.,  §2.Tangent has taken on the interesting position of requesting a jury to hear the case instead of a judge.   Clearly, the intent is to appeal to peers or citizens who will hear testimony as to the unfair practices of Microsoft.   There is the grave risk on the part of the Tangent argument that the issues are very complicated and so technically that only engineers or legally trained experts can decided on the case.   It can be equally promised that Microsoft lawyers will attempt to convolute the issue to a level of complicate techno speak in order to confuse the jury and possible deadlock or mistrial.   Either way, the path for appeal is being paved.Without the normal constraint of frank competition in the marketplace and also because of â€Å"exclusionary practices† invoked by Microsoft as a standard practice, Microsoft has been able to perform in a way that the increases the â€Å"playing field† edge in its favor. Additionally, this method employed by Microsoft works to preserve or artificially maintain prices at anti-competitive conditions that cause harm to vendors and business partners. [4]In essence, Tangent has charged that Microsoft has artificially inflated prices for the cost of the operating system software for certified partners who have no other choice in the matter thus injuring Tangent.One of the strongest positions taken by Tangent against Microsoft is that the Microsoft server OS (operatio n system) includes specific, unique, undocumented programs and screens (interfaces) accessed and employed by its servers to communicate seamlessly and tacitly with one another.   Primarily, the use of several servers (server farm) is within a multiple network server community.â€Å"Tangent alleged further that Microsoft entered into restrictive agreements with OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturer) and system builders, limiting or eliminating their ability to feature non-Microsoft products.† [5]Cleary, the most important aspect of the Tangents argument, which in this case can be asserted by any plaintiff, is for Microsoft to cease marketing products under the guise that the uniformity of it’s software is standardize and practical.   This is not the case nor has it been in quite a while.   The position by Microsoft does not give rise to a supportive community of certified partners.   Candidly, it causes a minor panic.Microsoft’s secretive and clandestine modus operand lends it self to a sense of obvious guilt.   The resistance to the release of the source code for any of it’s of its operating systems underlies its non-competitive practices.Demonstrating no lack of indignation, Microsoft has chosen not to respond to any comments on this complaint or that fact any other.   Their practice has been to only to acknowledge that the case is being reviewed.Tangent is based in the San Francisco Bay Area city of Burlingame and builds custom configured-to-order desktops, notebooks, thin clients and servers primarily for educational institutions, government agencies, business markets and proprietary enterprises.   The company is using the Microsoft Operating Systems. [1]   -Microsoft faces fresh US and EU antitrust complaints 23rd February 2006 [2] http://wowtechminute.com/93/antitrust-lawsuit-antithesis/ Antitrust Lawsuit Antithesis Posted by Brent Norris Technology News March 2006 [3] http://news.com.com/Computer+maker+files+an titrust+suit+against+Microsoft/2100-1014_3-6041788.html By Ina Fried Staff Writer, CNET News.com Published: February 21, 2006, [4] http://www.theinquirer.net/default.aspx?article=29797 Off at a tangent By INQUIRER staff: Monday 20 February 2006, 10:10 [5] http://www.channelinsider.com/article/Tangent+Suit+Claims+Microsoft+Soaked+Partners/171923_1.aspx   Tangent Suit Claims Microsoft Soaked Partners DATE: 21-FEB-2006 By John Hazard

A Dirty Job Chapter 10

PART TWO SECONDHAND SOULS Do not seek death. Death will find you. But seek the road which makes death a fulfillment. – Dag Hammarskjà ¶ld 10 DEATH TAKES A WALK Mornings, Charlie walked. At six, after an early breakfast, he would turn the care of Sophie over to Mrs. Korjev or Mrs. Ling (whoever's turn it was) for the workday and walk – stroll really, pacing out the city with the sword-cane, which had become part of his daily regalia, wearing soft, black-leather walking shoes and an expensive, secondhand suit that had been retailored at his cleaner's in Chinatown. Although he pretended to have a purpose, Charlie walked to give himself time to think, to try on the size of being Death, and to look at all the people out and about in the morning. He wondered if the girl at the flower stand, from whom he often bought a carnation for his lapel, had a soul, or would give hers up while he watched her die. He watched the guy in North Beach make cappuccinos with faces and fern leaves drawn in the foam, and wondered if a guy like that could actually function without a soul, or was his soul collecting dust in Charlie's back room? There were a lot of people to see, and a lot of thinking to be done. Being out among the people of the city, when they were just starting to move, greeting the day, making ready, he started to feel not just the responsibility of his new role, but the power, and finally, the specialness. It didn't matter that he had no idea what he was doing, or that he might have lost the love of his life for it to happen; he had been chosen. And realizing that, one day as he walked down California Street, down Nob Hill into the financial district, where he'd always felt inferior and out of touch with the world, as the brokers and bankers quickstepped around him, barking into their cell phones to Hong Kong or London or New York and never making eye contact, he started to not so much stroll, as strut. That day Charlie Asher climbed onto the California Street cable car for the first time since he was a kid, and hung off the bar, out over the street, holding out the sword-cane as if charging, with Hondas and Mercedes zooming along the street beside him, passing under his armpit just inches away. He got off at the end of the line, bought a Wall Street Journal from a machine, then walked to the nearest storm drain, spread out the Journal to protect his trousers against oil stains, then got down on his hands and knees and screamed into the drain grate, â€Å"I have been chosen, so don't fuck with me!† When he stood up again, a dozen people were standing there, waiting for the light to change. Looking at him. â€Å"Had to be done,† Charlie said, not apologizing, just explaining. The bankers and the brokers, the executive assistants and the human-resource people and the woman on her way to serve up clam chowder in a sourdough bowl at the Boudin Bakery, all nodded, not sure exactly why, except that they worked in the financial district, and they all understood being fucked with, and in their souls if not in their minds, they knew that Charlie had been yelling in the right direction. He folded his paper, tucked it under his arm, then turned and crossed the street with them when the light changed. Sometimes Charlie walked whole blocks when he thought only of Rachel, and would become so engrossed in the memory of her eyes, her smile, her touch, that he ran straight into people. Other times people would bump into him, and not even lift his wallet or say â€Å"excuse me,† which might be a matter of course in New York, but in San Francisco meant that he was close to a soul vessel that needed to be retrieved. He found one, a bronze fireplace poker, set out by the curb with the trash on Russian Hill. Another time, he spotted a glowing vase displayed in the bay window of a Victorian in North Beach. He screwed up his courage and knocked on the door, and when a young woman answered, and came out on the porch to look for her visitor, and was bewildered because she didn't see anyone there, Charlie slipped past her, grabbed the vase, and was out the side door before she came back in, his heart pounding like a war drum, adrenaline sizzling through his veins like a hormonal tilt-a-wh irl. As he headed back to the shop that particular morning, he realized, with no little sense of irony, that until he became Death, he'd never felt so alive. Every morning, Charlie tried to walk in a different direction. On Mondays he liked to go up into Chinatown just after dawn, when all the deliveries were being made – crates of produce, carrots, lettuce, broccoli, cauliflower, melons, and a dozen varieties of cabbage, tended by Latinos in the Central Valley and consumed by Chinese in Chinatown, having passed through Anglo hands just long enough to extract the nourishing money. On Mondays the fishing companies delivered their fresh catches – usually strong Italian men whose families had been in the business for five generations, handing off their catch to inscrutable Chinese merchants whose ancestors had bought fish from the Italians off horse-drawn wagons a hundred years before. All sorts of live and recently live fish were moved across the sidewalk: snapper and halibut and mackerel, sea bass and ling cod and yellowtail, clawless Pacific lobster, Dungeness crab, ghastly monkfish, with their long saberlike teeth and a sin gle spine that jutted from their head, bracing a luminous lure they used to draw in prey, so deep in the ocean that the sun never shone. Charlie was fascinated by the creatures from the very deep sea, the big-eyed squid, cuttlefish, the blind sharks that located prey with electromagnetic impulses – creatures who never saw light. They made him think of what might be facing him from the Underworld, because even as he fell into a rhythm of finding names at his bedside, and soul vessels in all manner of places, and the appearance of the ravens and the shades subsided, he could feel them under the street whenever he passed a storm sewer. Sometimes he could hear them whispering to one another, hushing quickly in the rare moments when the street went quiet. To walk through Chinatown at dawn was to become part of a dangerous dance, because there were no back doors or alleys for loading, and all the wares went across the sidewalk, and although Charlie had enjoyed neither danger nor dancing up till now, he enjoyed playing dance partner to the thousand tiny Chinese grandmothers in black slippers or jelly-colored plastic shoes who scampered from merchant to merchant, squeezing and smelling and thumping, looking for the freshest and the best for their families, twanging orders and questions to the merchants in Mandarin, all the while just a second or a slip away from being run over by sides of beef, great racks of fresh duck, or hand trucks stacked high with crates of live turtles. Charlie was yet to retrieve a soul vessel on one of his Chinatown walks, but he stayed ready, because the swirl of time and motion forecast that one foggy morning someone's granny was going to get knocked out of her moo shoes. One Monday, just for sport, Charlie grabbed an eggplant that a spectacularly wizened granny was going for, but instead of twisting it out of his hand with some mystic kung fu move as he expected, she looked him in the eye and shook her head – just a jog, barely perceptible really – it might have been a tic, but it was the most eloquent of gestures. Charlie read it as saying: O White Devil, you do not want to purloin that purple fruit, for I have four thousand years of ancestors and civilization on you; my grandparents built the railroads and dug the silver mines, and my parents survived the earthquake, the fire, and a society that outlawed even being Chinese; I am mother to a dozen, grandmother to a hundred, and great-grandmother to a legion; I have birthed babies and washed the dead; I am history and suffering and wisdom; I am a Buddha and a dragon; so get your fucking hand off my eggplant before you lose it. And Charlie let go. And she grinned, just a little. Three teeth. And he wondered if it ever did fall to him to retrieve the soul vessel of one of these crones of Chronos, if he'd even be able to lift it. And he grinned back. And asked for her phone number, which he gave to Ray. â€Å"She seemed nice,† Charlie told him. â€Å"Mature.† Sometimes Charlie's walks took him through Japantown, where he passed the most enigmatic shop in the city, Invisible Shoe Repair. He really intended to stop in one day, but he was still coming to terms with giant ravens, adversaries from the Underworld, and being a Merchant of Death, and he wasn't sure he was ready for invisible shoes, let alone invisible shoes that needed repair! He often tried to look past the Japanese characters into the shop window as he passed, but saw nothing, which, of course, didn't mean a thing. He just wasn't ready. But there was a pet shop in Japantown (House of Pleasant Fish and Gerbil), where he had originally gone to buy Sophie's fish, and where he returned to replace the TV attorneys with six TV detectives, who also simultaneously took the big Ambien a week later. Charlie had been distraught to find his baby daughter drooling away in front of a bowl floating more dead detectives than a film noir festival, and after flushing all six at once and having t o use the plunger to dislodge Magnum and Mannix, he vowed that next time he would find more resilient pals for his little girl. He was coming out of House of PF&G one afternoon, with a Habitrail pod containing a pair of sturdy hamsters, when he ran into Lily, who was making her way to a coffeehouse up on Van Ness, where she was planning to meet her friend Abby for some latte-fueled speed brooding. â€Å"Hey, Lily, how are you doing?† Charlie was trying to appear matter-of-fact, but he found that the awkwardness between him and Lily over the last few months was not mitigated by her seeing him on the street carrying a plastic box full of rodents. â€Å"Nice gerbils,† Lily said. She wore a Catholic schoolgirl's plaid skirt over black tights and Doc Martens, with a tight black PVC bustier that was squishing pale Lily-bits out the top, like a can of biscuit dough that's been smacked on the edge of the counter. The hair color du jour was fuchsia, over violet eye shadow, which matched her violet, elbow-length lace gloves. She looked up and down the street and, when she didn't see anyone she knew, fell into step next to Charlie. â€Å"They're not gerbils, they're hamsters,† Charlie said. â€Å"Asher, do you have something you've been keeping from me?† She tilted her head a little, but didn't look at him when she asked, just kept her eyes forward, scanning the street for someone who might recognize her walking next to Charlie, thus forcing her to commit seppuku. â€Å"Jeez, Lily, these are for Sophie!† Charlie said. â€Å"Her fish died, so I'm bringing her some new pets. Besides, that whole gerbil thing is an urban myth – â€Å" â€Å"I meant that you're Death,† Lily said. Charlie nearly dropped his hamsters. â€Å"Huh?† â€Å"It's so wrong – † Lily continued, walking on after Charlie had stopped in his tracks, so now he had to scurry to catch up to her. â€Å"Just so wrong, that you would be chosen. Of all of life's many disappointments, I'd have to say that this is the crowning disappointment.† â€Å"You're sixteen,† Charlie said, still stumbling a little at the matter-of-fact way she was discussing this. â€Å"Oh, throw that in my face, Asher. I'm only sixteen for two more months, then what? In the blink of an eye my beauty becomes but a feast for worms, and I, a forgotten sigh in a sea of nothingness.† â€Å"Your birthday is in two months? Well, we'll have to get you a nice cake,† Charlie said. â€Å"Don't change the subject, Asher. I know all about you, and your Death persona.† Charlie stopped again and turned to look at her. This time, she stopped as well. â€Å"Lily, I know I've been acting a little strangely since Rachel died, and I'm sorry you got in trouble at school because of me, but it's just been trying to deal with it all, with the baby, with the business. The stress of it all has – â€Å" â€Å"I have The Great Big Book of Death,† Lily said. She steadied Charlie's hamsters when he lost his grip. â€Å"I know about the soul vessels, about the dark forces rising if you fuck up, all that stuff – all of it. I've known longer than you have, I think.† Charlie didn't know what to say. He was feeling panic and relief at the same time – panic because Lily knew, but relief because at least someone knew, and believed it, and had actually seen the book. The book! â€Å"Lily, do you still have the book?† â€Å"It's in the store. I hid it in the back of the glass cabinet where you keep the valuable stuff that no one will ever buy.† â€Å"No one ever looks in that cabinet.† â€Å"No kidding? I thought if you ever found it, I'd say it had always been there.† â€Å"I have to go.† He turned and started walking the other direction, but then realized that they had already been heading toward his neighborhood and turned around again. â€Å"Where are you going?† â€Å"To get some coffee.† â€Å"I'll walk with you.† â€Å"You will not.† Lily looked around again, wary that someone might see them. â€Å"But, Lily, I'm Death. That should at least have given me some level of cool.† â€Å"Yeah, you'd think, but it turns out that you have managed to suck the cool out of being Death.† â€Å"Wow, that's harsh.† â€Å"Welcome to my world, Asher.† â€Å"You can't tell anyone about this, you know that?† â€Å"Like anyone cares what you do with your gerbils.† â€Å"Hamsters! That's not – â€Å" â€Å"Chill, Asher.† Lily giggled. â€Å"I know what you mean. I'm not going to tell anyone – except Abby knows – but she doesn't care. She says she's met some guy who's her dark lord. She's in that stage where she thinks a dick is some kind of mystical magic wand.† Charlie adjusted his hamster box uncomfortably. â€Å"Girls go through a stage like that?† Why was he just hearing about this now? Even the hamsters looked uncomfortable. Lily turned on a heel and started up the street. â€Å"I'm not having this conversation with you.† Charlie stood there, watching her go, balancing the hamsters and his completely useless sword-cane while trying to dig his cell phone out of his jacket pocket. He needed to see that book, and he needed to see it sooner than the hour it would take him to get home. â€Å"Lily, wait!† he called. â€Å"I'm calling a cab, I'll give you a ride.† She waved him off without looking and kept walking. As he was waiting for the cab company to answer, he heard it, the voice, and he realized that he was standing right over a storm drain. It had been over a month since he'd heard them, and he thought maybe they'd gone. â€Å"We'll have her, too, Meat. She's ours now.† He felt the fear rise in his throat like bile. He snapped the phone shut and ran after Lily, cane rattling and hamsters bouncing as he went. â€Å"Lily, wait! Wait!† She spun around quickly and her fuchsia wig only did the quarter turn instead of the half, so her face was covered with hair when she said, â€Å"One of those ice-cream cakes from Thirty-one Flavors, okay? After that, despair and nothingness.† â€Å"We'll put that on the cake,† Charlie said.